British Security Minister Dan Jarvis announced that national security exemptions will be included in the UK government's proposed ransomware payment ban, addressing concerns that the legislation could force critical organizations into impossible choices during cyberattacks.
Speaking at the Financial Times' Cyber Resilience Summit: Europe in London on December 3, Security Minister Dan Jarvis confirmed details about the ransomware payment ban proposal. The ban underwent public consultation from January to April 2025, receiving support from three-quarters of respondents. The UK government confirmed the ban in July and published a detailed policy paper on September 2. The proposed legislation would prohibit ransomware payments for public sector and critical national infrastructure organizations, while requiring other businesses to notify the government of any intent to pay ransoms.
Provisions of the proposed ban:
Implementation timeline and consultation:
International coordination:
Security Minister Dan Jarvis explained the reasoning behind national security exemptions, stating the government has acknowledged warnings about potential negative consequences, "That's why we're looking very carefully at national security exemptions, because we don't want people to be facing an invidious choice between a hospital shutting down or going to jail."
Jarvis also criticized current ransomware payment practices, saying the arrangement for each organization to choose whether to pay is "not sustainable" as it doesn't offer organizations any meaningful guarantee they will get their data back.
The inclusion of national security exemptions acknowledges that bans without flexibility could force healthcare facilities, emergency services, and other essential organizations to choose between breaking the law or allowing critical systems to remain offline, potentially endangering lives.
If the UK successfully implements this ban with Five Eyes and G7 allies following suit, it could create the first coordinated international framework to financially disincentivize ransomware attacks. Many ransomware organizations operate globally, targeting victims across multiple jurisdictions, so if the UK can successfully disincentivize these attacks, it could lay the groundwork for further threat prevention. Coordinated action could disrupt the ransomware business model by restricting access to ransom payments across different economies.
As this legislation progresses through Parliament, organizations in the public sector and critical infrastructure should begin preparing compliance frameworks and incident response plans that account for the ban. Private sector businesses should also establish notification protocols for ransom payment considerations. The success of this approach could set a precedent for international ransomware policy.
Insurers may adjust policies, premiums, or payout conditions to align with new legal limits on ransom payments.
It may restrict negotiators’ ability to engage with attackers and increase emphasis on technical recovery instead of payment discussions.
Yes, early notification may allow authorities to provide intelligence, guidance, or assistance sooner.
They may face added pressure to strengthen defenses since paying ransoms becomes less viable.